软件商提供屏蔽不良信息软件是否构成侵权？

*ZANGO, INC., Plaintiff–Appellant, v. KASPERSKY LAB, INC., Defendant–Appellee，568 F. 3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2009).

我们要做出裁判的问题是：在网络媒体公司主张网络安全软件的经销商干预其用户使用可下载的软件时，网络安全软件的经销商是否有权获得1996年《通信规范法》（《美国法典汇编》第47编230条）安全港规定的豁免。

We must decide whether a distributor of Internet security software is entitled to immunity under the safe harbor provision of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230, from a suit claiming that its software interfered with the use of downloadable programs by customers of an online media company.

Zango股份有限公司（以下简称“Zango”）是一家互联网公司，对于同意在浏览网页时观看广告的用户提供在线视频、游戏、音乐、工具和程序等。Zango对Kaspersky实验室（以下简称“Kaspersky”）提起诉讼，因为Kaspersky提供软件用于过滤和屏蔽潜在的恶意软件，但却不当屏蔽了Zango的软件。Kaspersky援引《通信规范法》230(c)(2)(B) 1关于过滤和屏蔽让人反感的（offensive）信息材料的“善良的撒玛利亚人（good samaritan）”保护规定。地方法院作出简易判决支持了Kaspersky，判定Kaspersky是交互式计算机服务的提供者，其采取措施向他人提供技术手段以限制让人反感的（objectionable）的信息内容访问，应享有豁免权。上诉法院认同地方法院的观点，维持其判决。

Zango, Inc. (Zango) is an Internet company that provides access to a catalog of online videos, games, music, tools, and utilities to consumers who agree to view advertisements while they browse the Internet.  It brought this action against Kaspersky Lab, Inc., (Kaspersky) which distributes software that helps filter and block potentially malicious software, for improperly blocking Zango’s software. Kaspersky invoked the protection of § 230(c)(2)(B) 1 for ‘‘good samaritan’’ blocking and screening of offensive material.  The district court granted summary judgment in Kaspersky’s favor, holding that it is a provider of an ‘‘interactive computer service’’ entitled to immunity for actions taken to make available to others the technical means to restrict access to objectionable material.  We agree, and affirm.

Zango公司有4个可供下载的软件程序——Zango、Seekmo、Hotbar、Spam Blocker Utility。若消费者同意下载安装其中之一并在浏览网页时接收广告，Zango则提供免费的目录。对于Hotbar、Spam Blocker Utility这两个软件，Zango还提供了豪华版（premium version），如果用户不想浏览广告，可付费免广告。

Zango has four downloadable software programs—‘‘Zango,’’ ‘‘Seekmo,’’ ‘‘Hotbar,’’ and ‘‘Spam Blocker Utility.’’  Zango provides free access to its catalog if customers agree to download and install one of these programs, and to receive online ads that are displayed as they browse the Internet. It also offers a premium version of ‘‘Hotbar’’ and ‘‘Spam Blocker Utility’’ for which customers may pay if they wish to access Zango’s catalog without having to view advertisements.

Kaspersky是位于俄罗斯的Kaspersky Lab ZAO开发的互联网安全软件在美国的分销商，Kaspersky的产品中包括“Kaspersky网络安全”(以下简称“KIS”) 和“Kaspersky 反病毒”  (以下简称“KAV”)。Kaspersky的软件可以帮助过滤和屏蔽用户不需要的恶意软件（malware），这些软件会危害电脑的安全和功能。恶意软件危害用户的隐私、损坏电脑文件，盗取身份信息，或者自动打开不需要的网页链接，包括色情网页等。

Kaspersky is the U.S. distributor of Internet security software developed by Kaspersky Lab ZAO, which is based in Russia. Among Kaspersky’s products are ‘‘Kaspersky Internet Security’’ (KIS) and ‘‘Kaspersky Anti–Virus’’ (KAV).  Its software helps filter and block unwanted malicious software, known as ‘‘malware,’’ that can compromise the security and functionality of a computer.  Malware works by, for example, compromising a user’s privacy, damaging computer files, stealing identities, or spontaneously opening Internet links to unwanted websites, including pornography sites.

Kaspersky软件将Zango的程序定义为广告软件（adware），恶意软件之一种。广告软件一旦被安装，便会监视用户的网络浏览习惯，当用户上网时并会自动弹出广告。广告软件也可以打开连接，将用户的计算机链接到存储恶意软件的网站或服务器上，使用户的计算机暴露在感染中，占用其内存，让计算机速度变慢，性能降低。基于这些原因，用户并不喜欢弹窗广告和广告软件，通常会安装安全软件来屏蔽广告软件。

The Kaspersky software classifies Zango’s programs as adware, a type of malware.  Once installed on a user’s computer, adware monitors a user’s Internet browsing habits and causes ‘‘pop-up ads’’ to appear on a computer screen while the user browses the Internet.  Adware can also open links to websites and computer servers that host malware and expose users’ computers to infection, and can swamp a computer’s memory and slow down computer speed and performance. For these reasons, pop-up ads and adware are unpopular among computer users, and consumers often install security software specifically to block adware.

Kaspersky的软件会发现恶意软件，这些恶意软件可能存在于电子邮箱里、网页上或者用户要下载的软件程序中。如果Kaspersky的软件发现下载内容的特点和恶意软件的特点一样，那么就会警告用户下载可能含有恶意软件，理论上说（有争议）Kaspersky的用户可以选择是否继续还是放弃下载可能含有恶意软件的程序。

The Kaspersky software detects malware that may be present in an e-mail, web page, or software program that a computer user is about to download.  If the Kaspersky software determines that the download has characteristics that are consistent with malware, the software warns the user that the download contains possible malware.  Theoretically (though this is contested), the user of the Kaspersky software then has the option whether to allow or reject the download of the potential malware-carrying program.

Kaspersky软件通过网络连接在线数据库，并通过莫斯科的俄罗斯机构更新服务。安全软件定期更新以紧跟恶意软件的趋势，因为恶意软件始终在发展变化。Kaspersky软件的用户可以将软件设置成自动连接在线更新服务器，也可以手动将他们的软件与在线更新服务器连接。

The Kaspersky software is designed to communicate via the Internet with online databases and update services that Kaspersky’s Russian affiliate operates in Moscow.  The security software is designed to be updated regularly in order to keep malware definitions current, because new forms of malware are constantly being developed. A Kaspersky customer may configure the software to communicate automatically with these online update servers. Customers may also manually instruct their Kaspersky software to communicate with the online update server.

Zango公司宣称Kaspersky的网络安全软件从两个方面妨碍了Zango的用户同时使用它们公司的软件。首先，KIS禁用了Zango软件的 “工具栏”特征，在网站用户搜索一个特定主题的数据时，工具栏会在用户浏览器页面顶部放置相关广告网站的链接。此外，Zango公司声称KIS实际上不允许其用户同意Zango程序正在进行的操作。Zango主张，每次Zango程序想连接网络，KIS会显示一个警告，让用户选择是否清除Zango或者“忽略”这条警告继续浏览。然而，Zango公司声称，虽然KIS的警告包括一个“应用于全部”的复选框，旨在方便用户阻止警告重复弹出而通过选择“应用于全部”最终“忽略（警告）”，但这个复选框实际上是没用的。也就是说只要选了“忽略（警告）”，那么即使选了“应用于全部”，还是会不断出现警告。Zango称这样导致的必然结果就是用户不得不放弃同时使用Zango和KIS软件，从而允许Kaspersky的软件清除Zango的软件。

Zango alleges that KIS interferes with Zango customers’ concurrent use of the Zango software in two ways.  First, KIS disables the ‘‘toolbar’’ feature of Zango’s software, which provides a bar positioned at the top of the user’s Internet browser page that displays links to relevant advertisers’ websites to users searching for data on a specific subject.  Furthermore, Zango asserts, KIS does not actually permit Zango customers to consent to a Zango program’s ongoing operation.  Zango avers that each time the Zango program attempts to access the Internet, KIS displays a warning that gives the computer user the option either to block the Zango program or ‘‘skip’’ the warning.  However, while KIS’s warning includes an ‘‘apply to all’’ checkbox that presumably is meant to stop the repeated warnings if the user opts to ‘‘skip’’ and selects ‘‘apply to all,’’ Zango claims that the checkbox does not work. Consequently, a Zango user running KIS is forced to deal with constant warnings. According to Zango, the inevitable result is that a person using Zango and KIS concurrently gives up, thus permitting the Kaspersky software to block the Zango software.

Zango补充说，已经在使用KIS并想要下载Zango的人因KIS的这一做法而无法再下载Zango。当用户想要下载Zango软件时，KIS就显示 “网络防病毒警告”，建议用户关闭Zango软件的下载。“网络防病毒警告”允许用户点击“允许（下载）” 而忽视警告，然而一旦用户点击“允许（下载）”，另一个新的“网络防病毒警告”就会出现，称Zango软件不能被杀毒并拒绝访问。Zango坚称这最终使得Zango软件不可能被安装。

Zango adds that individuals who were already running KIS and who sought to download Zango software were prevented from doing so by KIS. When a user attempted to download Zango software, KIS displayed a ‘‘Web Anti–Virus Warning’’ that advised the user to block the Zango download.  The ‘‘Web Anti–Virus Warning’’ permitted the user to click ‘‘Allow’’ to override the warning and download the Zango program;  however, once the user clicked ‘‘Allow,’’ a new ‘‘File Anti–Virus Warning’’ appeared, stating that the Zango software could not be disinfected and that ‘‘write access is denied.’’  Zango maintains that installation of Zango software was made impossible as a consequence.

Zango称，反间谍软件行业的领军者，比如McAfee、 Norton (Symantec)和Webroot都不存在类似的问题，并且这些公司会告知自己的用户有Zango这款软件并且给Zango用户忽视建议的选择。2007年3月至2007年6月，Zango用户减少，Zango认为这是Kaspersky和其他反间谍软件清除了Zango软件的原因。

Zango states that it has not experienced similar problems with market leaders in the anti-spyware industry such as McAfee, Norton (Symantec), and Webroot.  Rather, Zango contends, these companies advise users of the presence of Zango’s programs and offer Zango customers the choice to ignore the advisory.  Zango attributes the decline in the number of its customers between March 2007 and June 2007 to interference with Zango software by Kaspersky’s software and by other antispyware software that similarly blocks the operation of Zango programs.

Zango软件对用户的威胁程度是争议的问题。Kaspersky认为，Zango的软件是广告软件，极有可能是间谍软件。间谍软件通常未经用户同意或知悉相关信息就安装在计算机上，暗中监视用户的活动，使用户密码和机密信息处于被盗的危险中。Zango则主张其只有经用户同意才会安装软件，并且提供了很容易从用户电脑上卸载其软件的方法。对于微软系统的用户，在用户计算机屏幕右下角“开始”栏里找到Zango的图标就有教用户怎样卸载的链接，在开始/程序菜单中也有“卸载ZANGO说明”。

The degree of threat posed to users by Zango’s software is in dispute.  Kaspersky contends that Zango’s software is adware, and possibly spyware.  Spyware, which is often installed on a computer without the user’s knowledge or consent, covertly monitors the user’s activities and exposes the user to the risk that his or her passwords and confidential information may be stolen. Zango maintains that it installs its soft ware only upon receiving user consent, and that it provides easy means of uninstalling Zango software from a user’s computer. For users of Microsoft’s Windows operating systems, these include a Zango icon in the system tray in the bottom right corner of a user’s computer screen, which leads to a link where users are informed how to uninstall Zango software, as well as ‘‘Uninstall Zango Instructions’’ available in the Start/programs menu.

Zango最初在华盛顿州法院提起诉讼，提出了包括禁令救济、第三人侵害合同权利、违反《华盛顿州消费者保护法》、商业诽谤和不当得利的诉请。Kaspersky将这一案件转移到联邦法院。地区法院拒绝了Zango的临时限制令的请求。Kaspersky随后要求根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》 12(b)(6)驳回原告的诉讼请求，当事人和法院认为这是根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第56条申请简易判决。法院作出了简易判决，理由是Kaspersky有权获得上述《通信规范法》230(c)(2)(B)规定的豁免。

Zango initially brought this action in Washington state court, advancing claims for injunctive relief, tortious interference with contractual rights, violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act, trade libel, and unjust enrichment.  Kaspersky removed the case to federal court. The district court denied Zango’s request for a temporary restraining order, and Kaspersky subsequently filed a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), which the parties and the court treated as a motion summary judgment under Fed. R.Civ.P. 56. Summary judgment was granted on the ground that Kaspersky is entitled to immunity under § 230(c)(2)(B).  

Zango在规定期限内提出上诉。

Zango has timely appealed.

Zango上诉请求的核心观点是：如果探究国会的本意， 230（c）的法定豁免权的适用对象是互联网内容的提供者，而不是提供过滤工具的公司。我们认为，对于向用户提供过滤或屏蔽令用户反感的信息材料的软件的交互式计算机服务提供者，该法显然是提供豁免的。

The heart of Zango’s appeal is that Congress intended statutory immunity under § 230(c) to apply to Internet content providers, not to companies that provide filtering tools.  We think the statute plainly immunizes from suit a provider of interactive computer services that makes available software that filters or screens material that the user or the provider deems objectionable.

[1] 230条是《通信规范法案》（以下简称“CDA”）的一部分，它为私人拦截或屏蔽令人反感的信息提供保护。CDA是“为了对未成年人接触网上的不良信息进行控制”而制定的。Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir.2003).

[1] Section 230, which provides protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material, is part of the Communications Decency Act of 1996(CDA), Pub.L. 104–104.  The CDA was enacted ‘‘to control the exposure of minors to indecent material’’ on the Internet.  Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir.2003).

230（c）（2）（B）规定：

（c）对拦截和屏蔽令人反感的信息材料的“善良的撒玛利亚人”的保护……

（2）民事责任

交互式计算机服务的提供者和用户不因以下行为承担责任：

（B）为信息内容提供者或他人提供或实现技术手段以限制对第1款规定内容的访问而采取的任何行动。

Section 230(c)(2)(B) provides:

(c) Protection for ‘‘good samaritan’’ blocking and screening of offensive material

…

(2) Civil Liability

No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of—

…

(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to the material described in paragraph (1).

豁免项下所屏蔽的材料包括“软件提供者或用户认为是淫秽、下流、色情、污秽、过度暴力、骚扰或其他令人反感的内容，不论这些内容是否受宪法保护。”（§ 230(c)(2)(A)）

The material that can be blocked under the exemption includes ‘‘material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected[.]’’ § 230(c)(2)(A).

法条将“交互式计算机服务”定义为“任何支持多用户登录的信息服务、信息系统、或者访问软件的供应商，特别是提供互联网接入服务或系统的图书馆以及教育机构）”。230(f)(2)（着重强调）。

The statute defines ‘‘interactive computer service’’ as ‘‘any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.’’ § 230(f)(2) (emphasis added).

  “访问软件提供商”是提供实现下述一种或多种功能的软件（包括代理和服务器软件）或执行工具的提供商：（A）过滤、屏蔽、禁止访问内容；（B）选择、选取、分析或者摘录内容。§ 230(f)(4)(A), (B).

“Access software provider’’ is defined in part as ‘‘a provider of software (including client or server software), or enabling tools that do any one or more of the following: (A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content;  (B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content.’’ § 230(f)(4)(A), (B).

[2]因此，只要供应商允许多个用户访问计算机服务器，软件或执行工具（能够过滤、屏蔽、允许或禁止淫秽、下流、色情、污秽、过度暴力或引起反感不适内容）的供应商对于提供技术措施采取的限制接入此类内容的行为享有豁免权。

[2] Thus, a provider of software or enabling tools that filter, screen, allow, or disallow content that the provider or user considers obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable may not be held liable for any action taken to make available the technical means to restrict access to that material, so long as the provider enables access by multiple users to a computer server.

Zango公司超越法条的字面含义、依据立法历史说明国会只打算给内容提供者豁免权。Zango特别指出，众议院会议报告明确称“[§ 230]条的一个特定目的就是推翻Stratton–Oakmont v. Prodigy案和其他把互联网服务供应商和用户当作内容（不是由他们制作的）出版者或发布者的类似案件决定，因为他们限制访问令人反感的内容”。（H.R.Rep. No. 104–458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).）。在Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services案中，法院认为，Prodigy作为提供在线公告板的互联网服务的提供者，需要为他人在其公告板上发布的诽谤性言论承担责任。（1995 WL 323710 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. May 24, 1995).）。Zango借此推导出， “善良的撒玛利亚人”所适用的豁免只保护信息提供者，否则他们可能要为他人制作的诽谤或淫秽内容承担责任。虽然这的确是 230(c)的一个特定目的和保护所及范围，但国会报告明确指出“善良的撒玛利亚人”的保护适用于230(e)(5) 定义的所有的访问软件提供者[在230(f)(4) 又接着做了列举]。访问软件的提供者包括任何“过滤、屏蔽、允许或禁止访问内容的软件提供者…或执行工具提供者…”因此，我们对条文的解读与与会者的初衷一致。

Going beyond the statute’s plain language, Zango relies on legislative history to show that Congress intended to grant immunity only to content providers.  In particular, Zango points to the House Conference Report’s statement that ‘‘[o]ne of the specific purposes of [§ 230] is to overrule Stratton–Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have treated [Internet service] providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because they have restricted access to objectionable material.’’ H.R.Rep. No. 104–458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).  Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services held that Prodigy, an Internet service provider that provided online bulletin公告 boards, could be held responsible for libelous statements posted by others.  1995 WL 323710 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. May 24, 1995). From this, Zango infers that the good samaritan provision was intended only to protect information providers from liability they might otherwise have for defamatory or obscene content prepared by others. While certainly this was ‘‘one of the specific purposes’’ of § 230(c) and one of the protections it extended, the conference report goes on to make clear that good samaritan protections apply ‘‘to all access software providers, as defined in section 230(e)(5) [subsequently renumbered as section 230(f)(4) ].’’  H.R. Rep. 104–458, at 194.  And the definition of access software provider includes any ‘‘provider of software … or enabling tools that … filter, screen, allow, or disallow content.’’  Therefore, our reading of the text comports with the conferees’ expectations.

对过滤广告和恶意软件的程序提供者给予保护也符合国会在230条中明确表达的豁免目标。这涉及到五项政策目标，其中有两项涉及到本案中的问题：“鼓励技术发展，这样能使因特网和其他交互式计算机服务的个人、家庭和学校等用户，对收到的信息实现最大化的控制”，以及“为拦截和过滤技术的发展和使用除去不利因素，这样的技术能让家长限制他们的孩子接触令人反感或不当的网络内容”。随着更多的软件能够拦截恶意软件，用户将能够对传输到计算机的内容进行更多的控制。因此，为反恶意软件提供者提供避风港保护与国会在230(b)(3)表达的政策相一致。恶意软件也可能使用户暴露于不良内容，包括链接到黄色网页，链接到威胁用户隐私、电脑安全以及身份安全的软件。因此，对过滤恶意软件提供者进行避风港保护服务于230(b)(4)中的政策——为过滤令人反感或不当内容的软件发展清除障碍，否则他们将落入责任条款规制的范围内。

According protection to providers of programs that filter adware and malware is also consistent with the Congressional goals for immunity articulated in § 230 itself. Five policy objectives are identified.  Of these, two read on the issues in this case:  ‘‘to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services;’’ and ‘‘to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material[.]’’ § 230(b)(3), (4). As more software is developed to block malware, users will be able to exercise more control over the content that is transmitted to their computers.  Thus, affording the safe harbor to providers of anti-malware software aligns with the Congressional policy stated in § 230(b)(3). Malware may also expose users to objectionable content, including links to pornographic websites, or to software that can compromise the user’s privacy, computer security, or identity.  Thus, the policy stated in § 230(b)(4), of removing disincentives for the development of software that filters out objectionable or inappropriate material, is served by a safe harbor for providers of malware-filtering software who otherwise fall within the terms of the statute.

尽管以前我们曾对230(c)(1)规定的豁免做出过分析，这还是我们第一次考虑230条的具体适用。有关230(c)(1)可参见Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 565 F.3d 560, 563–64 (9th Cir.2009);  Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc);  Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir.2003);  Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1030–31。230(c)(1) 的直接目标是解决Stratton判决造成的问题。230(c)(2)（B）则规范的是针对限制令人反感的内容而向他人提供或实现技术手段采取的行动。正如我们已经讨论的，适用 230(c)(2)(B)来豁免屏蔽软件的提供者符合起草者的目的以及法规中明确的政策。总的来说，与我们之前遇到的案子不同，这个案件提出了一个不同的问题和法律规定的不同目标。

This is the first time we have considered this particular application of § 230, although we have previously addressed immunity under § 230(c)(1).7  See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 565 F.3d 560, 563–64 (9th Cir.2009);  Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc);  Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir.2003);  Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1030–31. Section 230(c)(1) is directly aimed at the problem created by the Stratton decision. Section 230(c)(2)(B), on the other hand, covers actions taken to enable or make available to others the technical means to restrict access to objectionable material. As we have discussed, the drafters’ purpose and the plainly articulated policies of the statute are served by applying § 230(c)(2)(B) to immunize the providers of blocking software.  In sum, this case presents a different problem, and a statutory provision with a different aim, from ones we have encountered before.

然而，Zango对Batzel案的解读是：该案暗示了230(c)(2)的豁免适用于为人们提供内容的网站运营者和互联网服务提供者，而不是那些提供过滤内容工具或机制的公司。因此，Zango主张，基于我们在Batzel判决中的230(c)(2)“使服务提供者免受追诉，前提是基于违反合同或者不公平的商业行为删除用户上传的内容” （333 F.3d at 1030 n. 14.）， Zango认为，Kaspersky没有提供可能出现令人反感的内容的服务，所以它不能从服务端上“删除”用户上传的内容。质言之，Kaspersky卖的是过滤软件，但不提供内容接入服务，所以Kaspersky不是法定豁免权的受益主体。我们不认为在Batzel案中我们是想表达这样的观点。我们认为， 230(c)(2)与Batzel案并不相关，当在描述230(c)(2)怎样鼓励“善良的撒玛利亚人”时，我们分析的是那起案件中的情况。Batzel案涉及一个网站和一个论坛，可能享有230(c)(1)规定的豁免权。Id. at 1030–31。在那种情况下，我们关于“删除用户上传内容”的表述说得通。相反，在现在这个案子中，Kaspersky将自己认为令人反感的内容通过技术手段限制他人浏览，这是一个不同的问题，可能享有的免责也不同。

Nevertheless, Zango reads Batzel to imply that the immunity in § 230(c)(2) was intended to reach website operators and Internet service providers who provide people with access to content, but not to companies that provide access to tools or mechanisms for filtering content.  For this it relies on our remark in Batzel that § 230(c)(2) ‘‘insulates service providers from claims premised on the taking down of a customer’s posting such as breach of contract or unfair business practices.’’ 333 F.3d at 1030 n. 14.  Zango contends that Kaspersky does not maintain a service on which objectionable material may appear and so cannot ‘‘take down’’ a customer’s posting from its service;   put differently, as Zango sees it, Kaspersky, which sells filtering software but does not provide access to content, was not an intended beneficiary of statutory immunity. We disagree that we meant to imply this in Batzel.  As we recognized, § 230(c)(2) was ‘‘not relevant’’ to Batzel, and when we described how § 230(c)(2) ‘‘further encourages good samaritans’’ we obviously had in mind the circumstances at issue in that case.  Id. Batzel involved a website and listserv, and potential immunity under § 230(c)(1).  Id. at 1030–31.  In that context, our comment about ‘‘the taking down of a customer’s posting’’ made sense.  By contrast, this case involves providing the technical means for others to restrict access to material Kaspersky finds objectionable, which is a different problem with different potential immunity.  

只要Kaspersky是交互式计算机服务的“提供者”或“用户”，它就受 230(c)(2)(B)规定的保护，免于承担民事责任。没有人认为Kaspersky是“用户”， Zango还认为Kaspersky不是服务提供者。

Kaspersky will receive protection under § 230(c)(2)(B) for civil liability so long as it is a ‘‘provider’’ or a ‘‘user’’ of ‘‘an interactive computer service.’’  No one has argued that Kaspersky is a ‘‘user.’’  In Zango’s view, Kaspersky is not a provider, either.

[3]根据230(c)的字面规定，我们同意地方法院认定Kaspersky是服务提供者的观点。Kaspersky是一个“提供或使多个用户能够访问计算机服务器的访问软件提供者”，所以它“提供”交互式计算机服务。230(f)(2)。Kaspersky是一个“访问软件提供者”，因为通过提供反恶意软件的软件，它“提供软件…或执行工具 …过滤、屏蔽、允许或禁止访问内容。”230(f)(4), (f)(4)(A).并且，根据230(f)(2)条文的字面意思，通过向用户提供在线访问其更新服务器，Kaspersky “提供计算机接入或使多个用户能够访问其服务器”。

[3] We agree with the district court that Kaspersky is a ‘‘provider’’ of an ‘‘interactive computer service’’ under the plain terms of § 230(c).  Kaspersky ‘‘provides’’ an interactive computer service because it is an ‘‘access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server.’’ § 230(f)(2).  Kaspersky is an ‘‘access software provider’’ because, by providing antimalware software, it ‘‘provide[s] software …or enabling tools that …filter, screen, allow, or disallow content.’’ § 230(f)(4), (f)(4)(A).  And, under the literal provisions of § 230(f)(2), Kaspersky ‘‘provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server’’ by providing its customers with online access to its update servers.

Zango 辩驳道，仅仅提供在线更新这一个特征不能满足230(f)(2)对交互式计算机服务关于“提供或使多个用户访问计算机服务器”的定义，因为几乎每个商业软件应用程序都有能力通过互联网进行更新，而230(f)(2)要求交互式计算机服务器能“提供或使个用户能够访问计算机服务器”。据此，Zango认为，更新功能并不意味着应用程序本身就是一种允许多个用户访问服务器的服务。相反，Zango对“交互式计算机服务”提出了一种新的解释，认为只有当计算机服务使人们能够访问互联网或访问互联网上找到的内容，它才能被解释为“交互式计算机服务”。我们不同意如此狭隘地解读法律条文。从字面看，230条并不将“交互式计算机服务”限定在提供网络接入的范围，相反，它唯一要求的是“多个用户访问计算机服务器”230(f)(2)。

Zango argues that merely providing an online update feature does not satisfy § 230(f)(2)’s requirement that the interactive computer service ‘‘provide[ ] or enable[ ] computer access by multiple users to a computer server’’ because nearly every commercial software application has the capacity to be updated via the Internet.  For this reason, it posits, updating capacity does not signify that the application itself is a service that enables access by multiple users to a server.  Instead, Zango proposes a gloss on ‘‘interactive computer service’’ that would construe a computer service as ‘‘interactive’’ only if it enables people to access the Internet or access content found on the Internet.  We decline to read the statute so narrowly. As written, § 230 does not limit the definition of ‘‘interactive computer service’’ to services that provide access to the Internet;  rather, its singular requirement is for ‘‘access by multiple users to a computer server.’’ § 230(f)(2).

Zango 进一步指出，230(f)(2)这一条款要求Kaspersky为用户（Zango将这些用户定义为会主动寻找访问途径的用户）提供访问服务器上的内容。这个说法站不住脚，因为Kaspersky确实为用户提供了访问其服务器上恶意软件新定义的权限。条文也并不要求用户“主动”访问，230(f)(2)只说了提供或使“多个用户能够访问计算机服务器。” 毫无疑问，Kaspersky用户可以手动，即主动，访问Kaspersky服务器获得新的恶意软件定义。

Zango further maintains that § 230(f)(2) requires Kaspersky to provide users (whom Zango would define as persons who volitionally seek access) with access to content that resides on a server.  This argument is unavailing, for Kaspersky does provide users with access to the new malware definition content that is available on its servers.  Nor does anything in the statute require users to seek access ‘‘volitionally’’;  § 230(f)(2) merely speaks of providing or enabling computer access ‘‘by multiple users to a computer server.’’  In any event, it is undisputed that Kaspersky users can manually, i.e., volitionally, access the Kaspersky servers for new malware definitions.

此外， Zango质疑Kaspersky更新本身是否重要，提出用户有可能通过其他方法更新，比如CD，而这不会受到230(c)(2)(B)条文的保护。即便果真如此，我们不理解为什么用户可能通过不受保护的方式更新，会表明能提供在线更新服务的Kaspersky落在了法条保护范围之外。

In addition, Zango questions whether the method by which Kaspersky updates itself matters at all, given that users could possibly be provided with updates by other means that would not be shielded by § 230(c)(2)(B), for example, by CD. While true, we do not see how the possibility that a similar service could be provided by unprotected means indicates that Kaspersky, which does provide updates that are via the Internet, falls outside the zone of protection.

给Kaspersky提供“善良的撒玛利亚人”的保护并没有像Zango所担心的，会为所有的在线更新软件提供者打开豁免权的大门，230（c）在（2）（B）规定的第二项要求可以避免这种局面出现。根据其规定，交互式计算机服务要得到豁免，必须提供技术手段以限制对令人反感的内容的获取。因此，诸如文字处理器或视频游戏之类的非过滤程序，不会获得“善良的撒玛利亚人”的豁免。“交互式计算机服务”只包含“信息服务、信息系统或者访问软件提供者” 230(f)(2)，这一定义进一步限制了豁免的适用范围。正如我们已经说明的，Kaspersky之所以在法定的“访问软件提供者”范围内，是因为它是一个允许用户“过滤、屏蔽、允许或禁止访问的内容” 的软件的提供者。230(f)(4)(A)。

Neither does clothing Kaspersky with good samaritan protection open the door to immunity for any and all software providers that offer online updates, as Zango fears.   The second requirement of § 230(c) in subparagraph (2)(B) cuts off that slippery slope.  By its terms, to qualify for immunity, the interactive computer service must provide the technical means to restrict access to objectionable material. Thus, non-filtering programs such as word processors or video games would not be subject to good samaritan immunity.  The universe is further limited by the definition of ‘‘interactive computer service,’’ which includes only ‘‘information service[s], system[s], or access software provider[s].’’ § 230(f)(2).  As we have explained, the reason Kaspersky falls within the statutory definition of ‘‘access software provider’’ is that it is a provider of software that permits users to ‘‘filter, screen, allow, or disallow content.’’ § 230(f)(4)(A).

Zango进一步提出了理由主张230(c)(2)(B) 不能适用，因为是Kaspersky而不是用户判定了Zango是恶意软件，这一做法使用户使用Zango的愿望不能实现。Zango主张，将豁免权扩大适用至为他人提供过滤工具的互联网计算机服务的（B）目规定，在此种情况下不能适用。

Zango argues that § 230(c)(2)(B) cannot apply for the additional reason that Kaspersky, rather than the customer, determines that Zango is malware such that it overrides the customer’s desire to use Zango.  In this situation, Zango submits, subparagraph (B), which extends immunity to Internet computer services that provide filtering tools to others, is not applicable.

[4]再次强调，230(c)(2)(B)条文保护“为提供或实现对 A 目内容进行限制访问的技术手段而采取的任何行动”。通过提供反恶意软件的软件和恶意软件定义更新服务，Kaspersky能够实现且提供技术手段限制访问恶意软件。用户选择购买、安装、使用Kaspersky的软件。不论Zango对Kaspersky没有为其产品的用户提供无视安全软件并下载和使用Zango的指控是否正确，毫无疑问的是Kaspersky已经为其用户“提供了”限制访问它定义为恶意软件的内容的技术手段。因此，只要被拦截的内容是230(c)(2)(A)规定的令人反感的内容，Kaspersky就满足（B）目的保护条件。Zango在上诉中并未主张Kaspersky没有将Zango的软件视为指定的法定类别之一的“其他令人反感的内容”。230(c)(2)(A), (B)。

[4] To repeat, § 230(c)(2)(B) provides protection for ‘‘any action taken to enable or make available …the technical means to restrict access’’ to material covered by § 230(c)(2)(A).  By providing its anti-malware software and malware definition update services, Kaspersky both enables and makes available the technical means to restrict access to malware.  Users choose to purchase, install, and utilize the Kaspersky software.  Regardless of whether Zango is correct in its allegation that Kaspersky does not provide users of Kaspersky products a choice to override the security software and download and use Zango, there is no question that Kaspersky has ‘‘made available’’ for its users the technical means to restrict access to items that Kaspersky has defined as malware.  Therefore, Kaspersky satisfies the requirements of subsection (B) so long as the blocked items are objectionable material under § 230(c)(2)(A).  Zango has waived any argument on appeal that Kaspersky does not consider Zango’s software to be ‘‘otherwise objectionable,’’ which is one of the specified statutory categories.  See § 230(c)(2)(A), (B).

Zango还主张，230条不是要豁免其指明类别的商业侵权行为。但是，我们解释过230条是要给予商业侵权行为豁免。见Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1108, 1118–19 (9th Cir.2007)（该案中，法院认为CDA230条为州不正当竞争和虚假广告行为提供了豁免）。无论如何，230(c)(2)(B)的目的就是要为提供或实现技术手段以限制对令人反感的内容的访问的行为提供豁免。如果Kaspersky用户（购买安装了Kaspersky软件来拦截恶意软件）对Kaspersky软件的功能不满，他可以卸载Kaspersky，然后购买其他公司限制更少或更适应用户需求的软件。诉诸竞争与法条所表达的依靠市场来发展交互式计算机服务相一致。230(b)(1), (2).

Zango also suggests that § 230 was not meant to immunize business torts of the sort it presses.  However, we have interpreted § 230 immunity to cover business torts.  See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1108, 1118–19 (9th Cir.2007) (holding that CDA § 230 provided immunity from state unfair competition and false advertising actions).  In any event, what § 230(c)(2)(B) does mean to do is to immunize any action taken to enable or make available to others the technical means to restrict access to objectionable material. If a Kaspersky user (who has bought and installed Kaspersky’s software to block malware) is unhappy with the Kaspersky software’s performance, he can uninstall Kaspersky and buy blocking software from another company that is less restrictive or more compatible with the user’s needs. Recourse to competition is consistent with the statute’s express policy of relying on the market for the development of interactive computer services. § 230(b)(1), (2).

正如Zango指出的，联邦地方法院仅依据（B）目就驳回了它的请求。Zango敦促我们选择基于（A）目而不去维持地方法院的决定，坚称Kaspersky是否善意是还需要进一步判断的事实。但是我们认为不需要考虑(A)目的豁免权，因为我们同意地方法院基于（B）目做出的豁免处理。

As Zango notes, the district court based its dismissal exclusively on subparagraph(B).  Zango urges us not to affirm on the alternative basis of subparagraph (A), maintaining that a triable issue of fact exists as to Kaspersky’s good faith.  However, we have no need to consider subparagraph (A) immunity because we agree with the district court’s disposition under subparagraph (B).

在某种程度上，Zango提出了一个不同的问题——表述中没有善意的（B）目，是否应被解释为暗含了善意（在（A）目有明确规定）的要素？该点争论未在诉讼中提出。见 Eberle, 901 F.2d at 818。就当前的目的，我们认为（B）目只有一个限制条件：豁免的保护仅延伸至“提供或使他人能够实现”技术手段的提供者，这些技术手段能够限制用户或内容提供者认为是令人反感的信息的访问。

To the extent that Zango in reply raises a different issue—whether subparagraph (B), which has no good faith language, should be construed implicitly to have a good faith component like subparagraph (A) explicitly has—the argument is waived. See Eberle, 901 F.2d at 818.  For present purposes, we note that subparagraph (B) comes with only one constraint:  the protection afforded extends only to providers who ‘‘enable or make available to… others’’ the technical means to restrict access to material that either the user or the provider deems objectionable.

结 论

联邦地方法院认定Kaspersky是《通信规范法案》（1996）所定义的“交互式计算机服务的提供者”正确。我们得出这样的结论：一个过滤、屏蔽、允许或禁止淫秽、色情、污秽、过度暴力、骚扰或其他令人反感的内容的访问工具提供者，提供或实现使他人获得限制这些内容访问的技术手段而采取的任何行动受到47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B)的保护，而免于承担责任。由于其软件符合这些要求，Kaspersky有权获得“善良的撒玛利亚人”的豁免。

The district court correctly held that Kaspersky is a provider of an ‘‘interactive computer service’’ as defined in the Communications Decency Act of 1996.  We conclude that a provider of access tools that filter, screen, allow, or disallow content that the provider or user considers obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable is protected from liability by 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B) for any action taken to make available to others the technical means to restrict access to that material. As its software qualifies, Kaspersky is entitled to good samaritan immunity.

维持地方法院的判决。

AFFIRMED.

FISHER，巡回法官，同意判决结论，但基于不同的理由。

FISHER, Circuit Judge, concurring:

结合Zango的上诉思路，基于《通信规范法案》“善良的撒玛利亚人”的豁免规定（即47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B)）的字面含义，我同意我的同事给出的结论，维持地方法院关于Kaspersky能够获得豁免而免责的判决。尽管如此，超越本案的事实将豁免权延伸，根据230(c)(2)(A)字面意思赋予屏蔽软件的提供者单方面拦截内容提供者传播的内容的权力，可能会带来严重的问题。这种危险是法律析取语言表述造成的，法条允许屏蔽“淫秽、下流、色情、污秽、过度暴力、骚扰或其他令人反感的内容，不论这些内容是否受到宪法保护”，其中“其他令人反感的内容”就是一种开放式无边际的措辞。见230(c)(2)（A），(B)。

I concur with my colleagues that the plain language of the Communications Decency Act’s ‘‘good samaritan’’ immunity provision, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B), given the way Zango has framed its appeal, compels us to affirm the district court’s judgment that Kaspersky is immune from liability.  Nonetheless, extending immunity beyond the facts of this case could pose serious problems if providers of blocking software were to be given free license to unilaterally block the dissemination of material by content providers under the literal terms of § 230(c)(2)(A).  The risk inheres in the disjunctive language of the statute—which permits blocking of ‘‘material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected’’—and the unbounded catchall phrase, ‘‘otherwise objectionable.’’  See § 230(c)(2)(A), (B).

Kaspersky是一个“允许多个用户访问计算机服务器的访问软件提供者”。230(f)(2)，它销售屏蔽软件是为使内容提供者或他人获得限制Kaspersky认为“其他令人反感的内容”访问的技术手段而采取的行动。230(c)(2)(A), (B)。Zango的软件是否属于230(c)(2)规定的“其他令人反感的内容”，这一点存在争议，但Zango未在诉讼中就此提出主张。国会显然希望计算机用户有过滤工具来过滤网上泛滥的令人反感的内容，通过给拦截软件的提供者免责一定程度上实现了这一意图。见 230(b)(3).但是， 230(c)(2)(B)关于豁免的规定涵盖的范围非常广，以内容属于“其他令人反感的内容”为借口，屏蔽软件提供者可能出于反竞争的目的或仅仅是恶意的想法，滥用豁免权来拦截内容。把关注焦点放在反竞争上，我担心的是屏蔽软件提供者无视用户的选择拦截竞争者提供的内容，并且当竞争者要求赔偿损失时根据230(c)(2)(B)免责。我怀疑国会本意并非要230(c)(2)(B)如此宽容。参照Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir.2003)为什么一项为了免除互联网服务提供者对令人反感的内容的制作者的责任的法律规定，最终会打败侵权行为和犯罪行为的受害者的诉求？

Kaspersky is an ‘‘access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server,’’ § 230(f)(2), and its sale of blocking software is an ‘‘action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access’’ to Zango, which Kaspersky considers ‘‘otherwise objectionable,’’ § 230(c)(2)(A), (B).  Arguably, Zango’s software is not ‘‘otherwise objectionable’’ under § 230(c)(2), but Zango waived that argument here.1  Congress plainly intended to give computer users the tools to filter the Internet’s deluge of material users would find objectionable, in part by immunizing the providers of blocking software from liability. See § 230(b)(3).  But under the generous coverage of § 230(c)(2)(B)’s immunity language, a blocking software provider might abuse that immunity to block content for anticompetitive purposes or merely at its malicious whim, under the cover of considering such material ‘‘otherwise objectionable.’’ Focusing for the moment on anticompetitive blocking, I am concerned that blocking software providers who flout users’ choices by blocking competitors’ content could hide behind § 230(c)(2)(B) when the competitor seeks to recover damages.  I doubt Congress intended § 230(c)(2)(B) to be so forgiving.  Cf. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir.2003) (‘‘Why should a law designed to eliminate ISPs’ liability to the creators of offensive material end up defeating claims by the victims of tortious or criminal conduct?’’).

在口头辩论中，对于偷偷拦截用户知情后其实想访问的内容的行为被230(c)(2)(B)豁免的可能性， Kaspersky强调其软件KIS在正常运行时会提醒用户它将要屏蔽内容。这时，会出现一个弹窗，用户可以不管KIS的警告单击相应的按钮来“允许”访问相关内容。但是，Kaspersky认为230(c)(2)(B)的豁免不依赖于这样的警告窗口或覆盖选项。其他屏蔽软件可能不那么受用户喜欢，或者不提供这样的覆盖选项或者提供了但很难使用。举一个假设的例子，一个网页浏览器由供应商配置，用来过滤掉第三方搜索引擎的搜索结果，所以可以永远屏蔽批评他或者对其竞争对手有利的网站。这样隐蔽的、反竞争的拦截行为归为法定豁免的行为——由访问软件提供者采取的、使提供者阻止其认为令人反感的内容的技术手段，还是值得商榷的。除非230(c)(2)(B)对拦截软件提供者认为可以归为“其他令人反感的内容”增加一些善意的限制条件，或者增加屏蔽行为必须与用户的选择一致的要求，否则豁免可能扩大适用于国会本不打算免责的行为。

When presented at oral argument with the possibility § 230(c)(2)(B) could immunize covert blocking of content the user would want to access—if the user knew about it—Kaspersky emphasized that its software, Kaspersky Internet Security (‘‘KIS’’), when properly functioning, warns the user that KIS is about to block content.  A pop-up window appears, and the user may ‘‘allow’’ the content over KIS’s warning by clicking the appropriate button.  But Kaspersky conceded that immunity under § 230(c)(2)(B) does not depend on the presence of such a warning or override option.  Other blocking software might be less accommodating to the user’s preferences, either not providing an override option or making it difficult to use. Consider, for example, a web browser configured by its provider to filter third-party search engine results so they would never yield websites critical of the browser company or favorable to its competitors.  Such covert, anti-competitive blocking arguably fits into the statutory category of immune actions—those taken by an access software provider to provide the technical means to block content the provider deems objectionable.  Unless § 230(c)(2)(B) imposes some good faith limitation on what a blocking software provider can consider ‘‘otherwise objectionable,’’ or some requirement that blocking be consistent with user choice, immunity might stretch to cover conduct Congress very likely did not intend to immunize.

计算机用户可以根据喜好自由更换屏蔽软件，这种市场导向的解决办法也为立法支持。见230(b)(2)。但是我担心的是，屏蔽软件的提供者其中最方便和熟悉的例子就是网页浏览器的提供者，会基于反竞争目的利用他们的软件屏蔽掉竞争对手的内容，而用户并不知道。如果用户并不知情，就不会更换软件，甚至不会向被屏蔽的提供者抱怨他们获取不了想要的内容而通知内容提供者，将像Zango在此处所宣称的那样。

Computer users are of course always free to replace their blocking software with software more in line with their preferences, and this market-based solution finds support in the statute.  See § 230(b)(2). But my concern is that blocking software providers—providers of web browsers being the most convenient and familiar example—could employ their software to block content for anticompetitive purposes without the user’s knowledge.  If users are unaware of undesired blocking, they would not know to switch to different software or even to complain to the blocked provider that they are having trouble accessing its material, thereby tipping off the content provider such as Zango alleges happened here when its users complained.

国会认为，豁免能促进用户使用屏蔽软件，因此而让互联网更加安全，而不是相反。见230(b)(4).但在我假定的这种情况下，豁免会被滥用。然而，在国会明确法律规定的含义或者将来有案件能够判决做出可能的限制之前，依据现有法律规定如此宽泛的措辞表述，我认为Kaspersky符合豁免条件。

In Congress’ judgment, immunity is necessary to facilitate users’ access to blocking software that makes Internet use ‘‘safer’’ than it otherwise would be.  See § 230(b)(4).  It would be an abuse of this immunity to apply it to blocking activity of the kind I have hypothesized here.  Nevertheless, until Congress clarifies the statute or a future litigant makes the case for a possible limitation, I agree that Kaspersky qualifies for immunity under this broadly worded statute.